A decade into the War in Afghanistan, many Americans are wondering what we are doing there and why we ever invaded the country to begin with. They seem to forget the context in which we invaded the country and surely cannot understand what were still doing in there. After the September 11th attacks, with support from a galvanized patriotic nation, President Bush ordered an invasion of Afghanistan in order to dismantle the Taliban regime that was harboring terrorists like Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist group. Only a few years later in 2003, the Bush Administration and senior military officials turned their attention away from Afghanistan and on to the invasion of Iraq. The invasion of Iraq took away valuable military resources from the War in Afghanistan. Subsequently, because of the neglected mission in Afghanistan, the Taliban and other insurgent groups were able to make a resurgence that has created problems in the conflict ever since.
The War in Afghanistan, which was once considered
“The Good War” during the controversial Iraq War, has now become a source for polarizing political debate here in the United States. This controversy over the war in Afghanistan and the current military strategy there has also sparked a broader debate over several key components of U.S. Foreign policy. Many Americans today are questioning what our true purpose and interest is in Afghanistan and whether or not we should engage in “nation building” in foreign countries such as Afghanistan.
To understand the larger issues and questions regarding U.S. Foreign Policy, it is important to analyze the current situation in Afghanistan and our various options in moving forward towards a withdrawal from the conflict. In 2009, President Obama
authorized a troop increase of 30,000, which increased our troop levels to a total of 94,000 by May of 2010.
[i] This increase in troops is part of a new dedicated strategy for Afghanistan that has been implemented by the Obama administration. The new strategy calls for the use of Counterinsurgency warfare (COIN). Counterinsurgency warfare is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government (U.S.) to defeat insurgency (Taliban/Al- Qaeda).
[ii] Put simply, counterinsurgency is whatever governments do to defeat rebellions similar to the one we are seeing in Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan.
[iii] At the core of counterinsurgency warfare is the idea of providing protection for civilians from the insurgents and limiting civilian casualties at the hands of the counterinsurgents. This means that the U.S. military’s operations must be strategic and sensitive to ensure that we are not killing innocent civilians, which turns the populous against us and limits our effectiveness in achieving our overall mission. This doctrine of the importance of limiting civilian casualties is put well here: “An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.”
[iv] Although Counterinsurgency warfare is producing success in Afghanistan, there are a number of other problems in the conflict that are inhibiting victory and peace in Afghanistan. The center of the problems in the conflict in Afghanistan revolves around the instability of neighboring Pakistan. It is important to understand that the conflict in Afghanistan is intrinsically linked to the Pakistan.
[v] The war in Afghanistan should be called the Afghani-Pakistani war because we are now engaged in fighting the Taliban and insurgents in both countries, specifically in the border regions where the Taliban and other insurgents have been able to take refuge as American forces push them out of strategic areas in Afghanistan. It is vital that we address this problem of Taliban taking refuge in Pakistan because even if we defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, they will be able to retreat to Pakistan and wait until a favorable time to return to the fight once we withdraw.
[vi] These various demonstrate that the harsh reality that until we understand and take control of the problems in Pakistan, we cannot make progress in Afghanistan.
[vii] In addition to the overall problem of instability in Pakistan, there are a few other detrimental issues that are affecting our success in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency expert and U.S. military advisor
Dr. David Kilcullen outlined these various issues concisely in his recent
Congressional Testimony about the conflict in Afghanistan. Besides the aforementioned problem of instability in Pakistan, Kilcullen discussed three other major problems that are ongoing in Afghanistan. The first of these problems has to do with the Afghan Government. President Karzai and the government lack credibility and legitimacy with the Afghan people and the international community as a whole. Without legitimacy, the Government has no support from the people it governs. This lack of credibility in the Afghan government causes many Afghans to turn to other sources, like the Taliban or local tribal warlords, to receive basic services such as food, water and security. The Afghan Government’s lack of legitimacy also effects the U.S. Military’s effort to win over the “hearts and minds” of the Afghans because as Kilcullen stated, “you are only as good as the government you are supporting.”
[viii] It is imperative for the Afghan Government to gain legitimacy so that they can take control of their country and provide security for their citizens and the overall region.
Another problem Kilcullen highlighted in his testimony is the issue of President Obama’s set timeline for troop withdrawal that begins in July of 2011. This deadline amplifies many of the other problems that we are experiencing in the conflict. The deadline creates a feeling of uncertainty among the Afghan people on the issue of whether or to be loyal to the United States because they think we are leaving and fear that once we leave, the Taliban will target them for supporting the U.S. This makes it difficult for our troops on the ground to work with the local populous in seeking out the Taliban. The deadline also creates a problem because it is very likely that the Taliban will sit and wait for us to leave and at which point they will make another resurgence like they did in 2003-2004 when we turned our attention to the invasion of Iraq.
The last problem that Kilcullen discussed in his testimony about Afghanistan is the lack of sufficient resources to provide security for the Afghan population. Many people would question this and ask “what 94,000 American soldiers is not enough.” The answer goes deeper than that. There is a substantial lack of well-trained Afghan soldiers, good-police forces, credible military leaders/experts and legitimate local civilian officials. With this deficit of Afghan resources, most of the work in the conflict is being done by our 94,000 troops, which creates quite a strain on our military. To properly provide security to the local populous, Afghan forces must be trained and able to start taking over the brunt of the work that our military is doing if we ever want to withdraw and leave a stable Afghanistan and region, this must happen soon.
So when can we withdraw from Afghanistan? We can only withdraw from Afghanistan when the time is right. These aforementioned problems in the current conflict must be addressed and solved before we can leave Afghanistan. We will be able to withdraw from Afghanistan when the Afghan Government and military can adequately provide security and basic services to the country and region. We cannot, under any circumstance, leave Afghanistan that way that is now; we cannot leave a unstable Afghanistan. If we did, we would run the risk of the Taliban returning to the country. The return of the Taliban would spark a regional meltdown (Pakistan) that would take away from everything that we have accomplished in the Afghanistan.
Why do we care if there is instability in Afghanistan? What are our interests in having a stable Afghanistan? First and foremost, it must be said it is in the United States’ best national interest to be in Afghanistan. Many Americans seem to forget that we first entered Afghanistan in order to seek out those who were responsible for the September 11th attacks so that a tragedy like that would never happen again. It is in our national security interests to be fighting extremist groups such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan so that they cannot take sanctuary there and plan and spread terrorism to the United States and around the globe. Furthermore, it is imperative that we create stability in Afghanistan so that there is not a regional meltdown that would bring Pakistan’s nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorists.
The thought of terrorists having nuclear weapons is frightening, but it will become a reality if we do not address the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan together.
Peter Bergen discussed this point succinctly here: “a stabilized Afghanistan is a necessary precondition for a peaceful South Asia, which is today the epicenter of global terrorism and the most likely setting of a nuclear war.”
[ix] In the interest of our own national security and global security, we must continue our efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan of denying terrorists sanctuaries and of creating stability in the region as a whole.
Nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists is not only a threat to our interest of national security, but it is also a threat to the related political interest of managing the balance of global power. As the world stands today, the United States is the sole super power in the world, but it wasn’t always like that. For over 40 years we were locked in the Cold War with the Soviet Union as both sides built up their nuclear arsenals and prepared for long-range nuclear strikes. The Cold War era was a frightening time for many people, where many people built bomb structures and school children practiced duck and cover drills. There were nuclear weapons as close a Cuba during the
Cuban Missile Crisis when the U.S. and the U.S.S.S.R. came to the brink of full scale nuclear war. Now imagine terrorists possessing a large nuclear arsenal like Pakistan’s. Not only would this be a grave threat to national security, but it is also would inhibit our ability to engage in trade and other economic ventures with our allies in other Muslim countries. Terrorists with nuclear weapons capabilities would use the threat of nuclear attack to accomplish their own politically motivated goals, which would surely be against the national interests of the United States.
In addition to national security and political interests in being in Afghanistan the United States also has a moral interest there. After invading the country in 2001 and dismantling the government it is our moral obligation not to leave an unstable country for the Afghans. We cannot just invade a country and then leave it in shambles after we accomplished a certain military goal. It is in our best interest to help Afghanistan rebuild their infrastructure and military. We must ensure that their government is stable and able to provide security to the Afghan populous.
This process of helping Afghanistan rebuild and stabilizing their government can be categorized as
“Nation Building.” Some Americans question why it is our job to rebuild foreign countries’ infrastructure and government and also question what benefits come out of spending billions of American dollars to do so. They see our campaign to bolster the Afghan government and infrastructure as a big mistake. These people are wrong. Our “nation building” efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere are a crucial part of overall U.S. foreign policy strategy for a few important reasons. Nation building is an investment in future allies to help counter our enemies in the overall balance of global power.
[x] By rebuilding the government in Afghanistan we are creating an ally in a very important region of the world, a region where we have many enemies. By creating an ally in Afghanistan, we gain power in the region and bolster ourselves against rivals in the region like Iran. This strategy of creating alliances to in counter rivals is part of the core ideal of the overall US foreign policy goal of trying to “prevent rival powers, like Russia, China, or Iran, from amassing enough power to seriously threaten our way of life.”
[xi] We would not be able to accomplish this goal if we weren’t engaging in nation building in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
The process of nation building also promotes stability
[xii], which is an important goal of our campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan. By rebuilding infrastructure and promoting a stable government, the process of nation building is creating a stable Afghanistan and is also bringing their economy back to life. Once Afghanistan is stable and the economy is back in full force, we will be able withdraw. After our withdrawal, we will have a strong and reliable ally in the region to counter enemies in the region such as Iran. Nation building is absolutely necessary and essential in order to promote global security and to ensure our way of life.
The War in Afghanistan has been a long and complicated war so far, but there is hope for the future. If we address some of these problems that have been discussed above and we continue to evaluate the war as it progresses, we will start seeing successes and get closer to a withdrawal from the country. This war is more important than ever and we must stay the course in our mission to create a safe, stable, and terrorist free Afghanistan.
God Bless America and God Bless Our Troops.
[i] "Number of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan Exceeds Total in Iraq for the First Time." The Washington Post. 25 May 2010. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. [ii] The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual New York: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Pg 3 [iii] Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Pg 2 [iv] The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual pg. xxv [v] Fick, Nathaniel C., and John A. Nagl "Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition" Foreign Policy Magazine Jan. & Feb. 2009 9 May 2009 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587>. [vi] Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan, Senate Foreign Relation Committee Cong. (2010) (testimony of David Kilcullen). <cnas.org>
[vii] Ricks, Tom. "The Good War?" Web log post. The Best Defense. Foreign Policy Magazine, 6 Jan. 2009. Web. 11 Oct. 2010. <http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/06/the_good_war>. [viii] Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan [ix] Bergen, Peter, and Leslie Gelb. "Two Arguments for What to Do in Afghanistan." Time 5 Oct. 2009. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1927095-1,00.html>. [x] Miller, Paul. "The Realist Case for Nation Building." Foreign Policy 23 Sept. 2010. Web. 11 Oct. 2010. <http://easybib.com/cite/form/magazine/pubtab/pubdatabase>. [xi] “The Realist Case for Nation Building” [xii] “The Realist Case for Nation Building”
Works Cited
Bergen, Peter, and Leslie Gelb. "Two Arguments for What to Do in Afghanistan." Time 5 Oct. 2009. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1927095-1,00.html>.
Fick, Nathaniel C., and John A. Nagl. "Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition." Foreign Policy 5 Jan. 2009. Web. 12 Oct. 2010. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/01/05/counterinsurgency_field_manual_afghanistan_edition>.
Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.
Miller, Paul. "The Realist Case for Nation Building." Foreign Policy 23 Sept. 2010. Web. 11 Oct. 2010. <http://easybib.com/cite/form/magazine/pubtab/pubdatabase>.
"Number of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan Exceeds Total in Iraq for the First Time." The Washington Post. 25 May 2010. Web. 10 Oct. 2010.
Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan, Senate Foreign Relation Committeee Cong. (2010) (testimony of David Kilcullen). Print.
Ricks, Tom. "A Good Plan for Afghanistan." Foreign Policy 13 Mar. 2009. Web.
Ricks, Tom. "Letter From Afghanistan." Foreign Policy 29 June 2010. Web.
Ricks, Tom. "The Good War?" Web log post. The Best Defense. Foreign Policy Magazine, 6 Jan. 2009. Web. 11 Oct. 2010. <http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/06/the_good_war>.
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24 : Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007. Print.
